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NEW ILLINOIS LEGISLATION REGULATING
STERILIZATION OF WARDS: DOES IT PROVIDE
ADEQUATE PROTECTION?
Miranda K. Pollak*
INTRODUCTION
Prior to January 1, 2010, attorneys and doctors in Illinois were faced
with a difficult situation when approached by the guardian of a ward, ad-
judicated as mentally disabled by the Illinois Probate Act, who was seek-
ing sterilization for the ward. No statutes or case law existed to guide an
attorney through the legal process of seeking the sterilization and to esti-
mate the outcome of such a request. Doctors, without legal regulations to
guide them, could base their decisions upon the risks and benefits to the
ward and the family, but they had no legal indicator on how to proceed.
Because no standards were set out either through legislation or prior cases,
attorneys argued their client's position before the court and hoped for a fa-
vorable result.
All of this changed though on January 1, 2010, when a new law be-
came effective in Illinois regulating the sterilization of a ward.' The un-
certainty of how to proceed with such a case is now replaced with a de-
tailed law which lays out specific instructions on how to seek court
authorization granting sterilization.2 Additionally, the law specifies what
factors the court will consider when making its decision based upon the
best interest of the ward.3
This new law came into fruition in part because of the K.E.J case
which had been in litigation since January 2003 and came to a final ruling
in April 2008.4 In K.E.I, the guardian of a ward, a mentally disabled
woman, requested court authorization for her to consent to the ward's ster-
ilization; the sterilization was not in accordance with the ward's desire and
* Miranda K. Pollak is a third-year law student at DePaul University College of Law and holds a Bachelor
of Science in Business Administration from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She is a staff
writer for the DePaul Journal of Health Care Law. She would like to thank Linda A. Bryceland for provid-
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1. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11la-17.1 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. In re K.E.J. v. K.E.J., 887 N.E.2d 704 (I. App. Ct. 2008).
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litigation ensued.' Once litigation concluded, Equip for Equality pushed
the Illinois Congress for legislation which would set a standard for sterili-
zation of a ward.' On August 11, 2009, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn
signed the sought after legislation, giving all those involved in this process
a set procedure and standard to be used in evaluating and deciding upon
these cases.' Although the law does not follow the exact standard set out
in the KE.J. case, it certainly influenced the language of the law.
BACKGROUND
History of sterilizing the mentally incompetent and "unfit" -
Eugenics background
Evidence of sterilizing mentally ill and disabled persons dates back to
1884, when one of Germany's leading gynecologists, Alfred Hunger, pro-
posed the idea as a method of preventing the inheritance of mental disabil-
ity.' Then in the late 1 9 th century and early 20th century, Francis Galton,
the founder of modem genetics,' proposed the idea of sterilizing mentally
disabled persons to prevent future generations from inheriting mental ill-
nesses.'o Galton made the proposition when in 1883" he invented the idea
and term "eugenics", which he defined as "the science of improving inher-
ited stock, not only by judicious matings, but by all influences which give
more suitable strains a better chance."l 2
Relying heavily on Charles Darwin's theories of evolution and natu-
ral selection, Galton believed that we could control and improve the popu-
lation by artificial methods. 3 He designed a "eugenics register" which
tracked the inherited characteristics of certain individuals and the suitabil-
ity of those characteristics to the rest of the population. 4 Galton decided
upon the favorability of these characteristics and wanted to classify people
5. Id.
6. Equip for Equality, http://www.equipforequality.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). Equip for Equality is an
Illinois organization dedicated to advancing the rights of disabled individuals.
7. Amanda Robert, New law prohibits involuntary sterilization, ILL. TIMES, (Sept. 10, 2010), available at:
http://www.illinoistimes.com/Springfield/print-article-6332-print.html
8. Susan Bachrach, Deadly Medicine, 29 THE PUB. HISTORIAN 19,24 (2007).
9. David J. Galton & Clare J. Galton, Francis Galton: And Eugenics Today, 24 J. OF MED. ETHICS 99, 99
(1998).
10. Id. at 101.
11. Chloe S. Burke & Christopher J. Castaneda, The Public and Private History of Eugenics: An Introduc-
tion, 29 THE PUB. HISTORIAN 5, 6 (2007).
12. Galton, supra note 9, at 101.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 100.
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into the following groups: "(a) Gifted, (b) Capable, (c) Average, or (d)
Degenerate."" For women with favorable characteristics, he proposed the
idea of encouraging early marriage and providing grants based upon the
number of children the women bore.'6
For those individuals with less favorable characteristics, specifically
those with mental disabilities, habitual criminals, and those deemed in-
sane, Galton suggested those individuals be prevented from reproducing."
Following Galton's suggestion, twenty-seven states in the union passed
sterilization laws by 1931" and some proponents of eugenics even sug-
gested euthanasia of those deemed "less favorable."" The laws provided
for both the voluntary and compulsory sterilization of criminals and those
"thought to be insane, feeble-minded or epileptic".20 By 1935 California
had sterilized 9,931 people based on Galton's eugenics beliefs and al-
though not all twenty-seven states sterilized as many individuals21 , the ide-
ology did not go unnoticed.
Eugenics spread to various other countries including to Germany
whose scientists shared and exchanged their findings on hereditary with
other scientists and proponents of eugenics in the United States, the Soviet
Union, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Scandinavia.22 The idea of artifi-
cially creating a better population through eugenics was exploited by the
Nazis in Germany who implemented a mass sterilization program meant
"to raise the birthrate of 'fit Aryans'."23 Estimates indicate that 400,000
Germans were compelled into sterilization because of this "program."2 4
After the Second World War the number those supporting eugenics
diminished and the principles became objectionable.2 5 Some attribute the
disappearance of the eugenics movement to the atrocities of the Nazis,
while others believe that it fell because it lacked factual support of its ef-
fectiveness and was replaced by advancing science.26
15. Id. at 100-01.
16. Id. at 101.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Burke, supra note I1, at 7.
20. Galton, supra note 9, at 101.
21. Id.
22. Bachrach, supra note 8, at 25.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Galton, supra note 9 at 101.
26. Daniel Wikler, Can we learn from eugenics?, 25 J.OF MED. ETHICS 183, 186 (1999).
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Constitutional Issue: Right to procreation and control one's own
body
Although the ideology of eugenics disappeared after the Second
World War, forced and coerced sterilizations in the United States contin-
ued well in the 1960s and 1970s. 2 7 Women specifically targeted for co-
erced sterilization included poor white women, "welfare queens," and
Mexican women crossing the United States border to give birth to their
children in America so they could receive welfare benefits.28
These coerced and forced sterilizations eventually resulted in law-
suits. For example, in 1973 the Southern Poverty Law Center brought a
lawsuit alleging that public clinics and hospitals were violating the repro-
ductive rights of women by forcing sterilization.2 9 This, however, was not
the first time the United States' courts dealt with the issue of sterilization
and the right of individuals to exercise control over their own bodies.
In 1942 the United States Supreme Court, in Skinner, reviewed a de-
cision by the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressing an individual's right to
procreation and the constitutionality of forced sterilization.3 0 Oklahoma
created legislation that called for the sterilization of habitual criminals,
who were defined as persons "convicted two or more times for crimes
'amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude."' 3' The criminal was
subject to sterilization so long as the procedure was not detrimental to the
general health of the prisoner.32
The Court was concerned that this law, which created the power to
sterilize, could have "subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects" as was
seen with the eugenics movement.33 "In evil or reckless hands it [could]
cause races or types . . . to wither and disappear,"34 which occurred during
the Second World War with the Nazis' mass sterilization program. Be-
cause sterilization is irreversible, the Court was particularly troubled that
the sterilized individual had no recourse if a mistake in judgment was
made; he would suffer "irreparable injury".
While Skinner set forth the rule that individuals have a right to pro-
create and that sterilization programs are subject to careful scrutiny be-
27. Rebecca M. Kluchin, Locating the Voices of the Sterilize ,29 THE PUB. HISTORIAN 131, 133 (2007).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 136.
30. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 541.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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cause they touch "a sensitive and important area of human rights" 6 , the
Court found in Union Pacific Railroad Co. that every person has the right
to control his own body." In Union, a plaintiff appealed an order that re-
quired she submit to a surgical examination in a personal injury case.38
The Court ruled that "no right is . . . more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded . .. than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others."39 It
further stated that a person has the "right of complete immunity; to be let
alone" from unwanted touching.40 This ruling further emphasizes the im-
portance courts have placed on self-autonomy and the movement away
from laws that allow for unwanted bodily interference such as sterilization.
The Illinois Supreme Court also addressed the right of an individual
to exercise control over his body in Pratt v. Davis.4 1 In Pratt, a physician
operated on a woman and removed her reproductive organs without first
obtaining her full consent.4 2 The physician admitted to "deliberatively and
systematically deceiving the woman" because he believed that her mental
state did not allow for her to make a cognitive and informed decision re-
garding her physical condition and the procedure. 43 The court ruled that
when a patient is mentally sound and no emergency condition exists, a
physician must obtain informed consent from the patient prior to begin-
ning a medical procedure." If the patient cannot consent for himself, then
a person lawfully authorized to act on behalf of the patient must first give
informed consent for the procedure to take place.45
The ruling in Pratt is extended to medical care and procedures per-
formed upon minors. Courts have found that medical professionals can be
liable for assault if they perform a surgical procedure upon a minor with-
out a parent's consent.46 Exceptions to this exist for emergency conditions,
or if the child is emancipated, or if the court has found the child to be a
mature minor.47
Illinois law also recognizes the importance of obtaining parental con-
36. Id. at 536.
37. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1891).
38. Id. at 251.
39. Id. at 251-52.
40. Id. at 252.
41. Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906).
42. Id at 563-64.
43. Id. at 564.
44. Id
45. Id.
46. 61 AM. JUR. PHYSICIANS §160 (2010).
47. Id.
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sent for medical procedures performed upon minors because of the mi-
nor's inherent immaturity. The Illinois legislature allows for a parent to
step in and give binding consent for a medical procedure.48 Just as minors
need consent from a parent for a medical procedure because of their di-
minished mental capacity, patients that are or become mentally incompe-
tent generally require consent from a guardian or conservator for a medical
procedure. 49 Although mentally disabled patients can sometimes make de-
cisions regarding their medical care, "if a patient's cognitive impairments
call into question his ability to make treatment decisions, medical treat-
ment may not be administered without adequate and judicially supervised
protection."" Although Illinois courts made decisions regarding the medi-
cal treatment of individuals with impaired mental capabilities prior to
January 1, 2010, it is on that date that Illinois' Congress formally put into
place a law guiding the review of such cases.'
SAMPLING OF OTHER STATES' APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE
Other courts throughout the country have been faced with the same
issue of what to do when a guardian is seeking sterilization of her ward.
While some states have statutes addressing the rights of wards in these
situations, other courts look to probate laws and the best interests of the
ward. For a brief look at what other states have done in such situations the
following cases from California, Alaska, and New Jersey are presented.
In 1999, a California Court Appeals addressed the issue of whether to
authorize co-conservators of their ward, a mentally disabled nineteen year
old woman, to consent to the ward's sterilization.5 2 The autistic ward in
Angela D. since birth had a severe developmental disability and suffered
from epileptic seizures and diabetes." She was unable to read or write,
and her speaking abilities were limited to simple statements of "hello" and
"goodbye."5 4 Her co-conservators, which were her parents, requested the
authorization for sterilization because the ward's doctors found that if she
were to become pregnant it could adversely affect her health." Specifi-
cally, the ward's doctors believed that if she were to become pregnant this
could trigger further epileptic seizures which could result in both the
48. Id.
49. 61 AM. JUR. PHYSICIANS §160 (2010).
50. Id.
51. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/lla-17.1 (2010).
52. Estate of Angela D. v. Angela D., 83 Cal. Rptr.2d 411, 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
53. Id.
54. Id
55. Id.
242 [VOL. 13.2:237
REGULA TING STERILIZATION OF WARDS
ward's and the fetus' death.5 6 According to the ward's psychological re-
ports it was likely that the ward would engage in sexual activity."
Sterilization was requested because it was the only feasible method of
birth control for this ward." In analyzing the request for authorization, the
California Appellate Court applied the statutory scheme applicable to this
issue.59 The statute requires that its elements be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt before the court could authorize the conservator to consent to
the sterilization of the ward.60
The statutory elements require: a) the person to be sterilized is inca-
pable of consenting to the procedure and is unlikely to become capable of
consenting in the future; b) the person is fertile and capable of reproduc-
ing; c) the person is capable of engaging in sexual activity, and it is likely
that the person is already engaging in or will soon engage in such activity
which is likely to result in pregnancy; d) Either of the following: (1) even
with proper training, the individual will be unable to care for a child be-
cause of the nature and extent of the person's disability (2) because of the
individual's medical condition, pregnancy or childbirth "would pose a
substantially elevated risk to the life of the individual to such a degree that,
in the absence of other appropriate methods of contraception, sterilization
would be deemed medically necessary for an otherwise nondisabled
woman under similar circumstances."; e) all less invasive contraceptive
methods are not feasible; f) the proposed method of sterilization is the
least invasive as possible to the individual's body; g) the current and
emerging medical science either 1) does not indicate that a less intrusive
and reversible method of sterilization is forthcoming, or 2) does not indi-
cate an advancement in the treatment of the individual's disability; h) the
ward has not knowingly objected to the sterilization."
After evaluating the facts of the case and the condition of the ward,
the California Appellate Court found that the co-conservators had met the
statutory requirements; thus it affirmed the trial court's grant of authoriza-
tion for the co-conservators to consent to their ward's sterilization.62
Alaska, unlike California, does not have a set statute laying out a test
to determine whether or not the court should authorize a guardian's con-
sent to sterilize a ward. Instead, Alaskan courts place the burden on the
56. Id.
57. Id. at 414.
58. Id. at 417.
59. Id. at 416.
60. Id.
61. Id
62. Id. at 422.
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guardian to prove by clear and convincing evidence that sterilization is in
the best interest of the ward.6 3 In K. C.M, the nineteen year old ward was
diagnosed with Down's Syndrome at birth.' Her I.Q. ranged in the fifties
which indicated she was moderately to mildly retarded.65 Although she
was considered educable and attended vocational training and worked two
hours a day at a fast food restaurant, she would always require some kind
of parental or custodial supervision.66 Upon reaching the age of majority,
her parents were appointed as her legal guardians because she was adjudi-
cated as an "incapacitated person."'
In evaluating this case, the court required a full judicial hearing with
the presentation of medical evidence before it would rule on the issue of
whether authorization should be granted for the sterilization." However,
the court first needed to determine if the ward was competent to make her
own decision whether or not she wanted to be sterilized.69 Additionally,
the court looked at whether the mental incompetency was likely to be
permanent."o After establishing the ward's level of competency, the court
next required an establishment of whether or not the individual was capa-
ble of reproducing.7' If she was able to reproduce, then the court evaluated
whether she would be adequately capable of caring and providing for the
child despite her disability.7 2 Additionally, the court required expert testi-
mony regarding the ward's physical and psychological ability to deal with
a pregnancy, or in the alternative, the detrimental emotional effects of ster-
ilization.""
The court further required proof that sterilization was "the only prac-
ticable means of contraception.74 To prove this, the guardian would need
to show detailed medical evidence as to what alternative methods of con-
traception were available, along with an explanation of why one of these
less drastic methods could not be implemented.75 Whichever method was
chosen for contraception the court required a showing that it was as least
63. K.C.M. & B.L.M. v. State, 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Ala. 1981).
64. Id. at 608.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id
68. Id at 612.
69. Id at 613.
70. Id
71. Id.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id.
75. Id.
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intrusive as possible."
Although the ward may not have had the mental capacity to decide
upon the sterilization, the court required testimony from the ward regard-
ing her understanding and desire for the proposed sterilization." The
ward's testimony would be weighed against her ability to understand the
consequences of the sterilization." Finally, the court closely scrutinized
the motivating factors for the sterilization because it wanted to ensure that
the procedure was pursued in the best interest of the ward as opposed to
the guardian's own convenience.79
In K.C.M the court found that although the petitioners had met some
of the requirements to be granted authorization to consent on behalf of the
ward for the sterilization, they did not adequately prove why less intrusive
methods of birth control could not be used."o Thus, the case was remanded
for another hearing on the matter of alternative forms of birth control and
for a better understanding of the ward's preferences.8
New Jersey, like Alaska, does not use a statutory based method to
evaluate whether sterilization of a ward should be authorized.8 2 The court
in Grady evaluated the case of a nineteen year old woman who had severe
Down's Syndrome." The woman at lived at home with her siblings and
parents and had attended special education classes at the public school;
however, she was unable to read, form complete sentences, or count be-
yond low numbers.84At home she could perform simple tasks such as dust-
ing and folding laundry, playing simple games and taking short walks."
Additionally, she could dress herself, but could not choose clothing appro-
priate for the season, she could bathe herself but was unable to regulate the
water temperature, and she could open a can of soup but was unable to
adequately control the stove temperature.86 Because her abilities to care
for herself were limited, she would always require a degree of supervision,
thus her family sought to have her placed in a group home for adults with
similar disabilities."
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. In Re Lee Ann Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 481 (New Jer. 1980).
83. Id. at 469.
84. Id. at 470.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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Although the ward had physically developed at the same progression
of other teenagers her age, her social and emotional development was im-
paired." She had "no significant understanding of sexual relationships or
marriage [and] if she became pregnant, she would neither understand her
condition nor be able to make decisions about it."" Her parents did not
notice any signs that she was engaged in sexual activity or that she was
likely to begin engaging in such activity; however, they provided birth
control pills for her believing it was a necessary precaution."o With the
impending likelihood that the ward would be placed in a group home, her
parents sought a permanent method of birth control because of its depend-
ability, and thus went to the hospital requesting sterilization for their
daughter." The hospital refused for perform the procedure, and litigation
ensued.92
Recognizing the gravity of their decision, the court noted it "must
take particular care to protect the rights of the mentally impaired when
considering the prospect of sterilization."" While admitting that parents
have the duty to care, nurture, and shelter their child, it is the court's deci-
sion to determine whether sterilization is necessary for the ward.94 There-
fore, it used the "best interests" standards and procedures when it deter-
mined whether to authorize sterilization of the ward.95 Under this
standard, the court required that an independent guardian ad litem (GAL)
be appointed for the case who must fully advocate on behalf of the ward.96
Then, the trial judge must find that the ward's incapacity prevents her from
making an informed decision regarding sterilization, and the ward's condi-
tion is not likely to improve in the future.97 Next, by clear and convincing
proof, the court must be persuaded that sterilization is in the best interest
of the ward, and the following factors should be considered when making
this determination:98
The possibility that the incompetent person can become pregnant ...
(2) The possibility that the incompetent person will experience trauma or
psychological damage if she becomes pregnant or gives birth, and, con-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id.
93. Id. at 472.
94. Id at 482.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 483.
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versely, the possibility of trauma or psychological damage from the sterili-
zation operation. (3) The likelihood that the individual will voluntarily en-
gage in sexual activity or be exposed to situations where sexual intercourse
is imposed upon her. (4) The inability of the incompetent person to under-
stand reproduction or contraception and the likely permanence of that in-
ability. (5) The feasibility and medical advisability of less drastic means of
contraception, both at the present time and under foreseeable future cir-
cumstances. (6) The advisability of sterilization at the time of the applica-
tion rather than in the future While sterilization should not be postponed
until unwanted pregnancy occurs, the court should be cautious not to au-
thorize sterilization before it clearly has become an advisable procedure.
(7) The ability of the incompetent person to care for a child, or the possi-
bility that the incompetent may at some future date be able to marry and,
with a spouse, care for a child. (8) Evidence that scientific or medical ad-
vances may occur within the foreseeable future which will make possible
either improvement of the individual's condition or alternative and less
drastic sterilization procedures. (9) A demonstration that the proponents
of sterilization are seeking it in good faith and that their primary concern is
for the best interest of the incompetent person rather than their own or the
public's convenience.9 9
These factors are not exclusive and they should be weighed according
to the circumstances of each particular case."oo Ultimately, the court will
authorize whatever it believes is in the best interest of the ward. After
considering all of the evidence provided in this case, the court in Grady
remanded the case back to the lower court for further proceedings in ac-
cordance with their opinion that sterilization was in the best interest of this
ward.10
This small sampling of presented cases were the ones the court in
KE.J. relied upon when it was made its decision whether to grant authori-
zation for the sterilization of K.E.J. Ultimately the case caused a push for
legislation in Illinois which resulted in the enactment of a statute which
courts are to rely upon from now on.
THE K.E.J. CASE
TRIAL COURT DECISION
Although the K.E.J. case began in January 2003, K.E.J.'s life first
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 486.
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drastically changed on May 28, 1986.102 On that day, at the age of eight,
K.E.J. was in a car accident that left her with severe head trauma and re-
sulted in permanent brain damage."o3 Following a personal injury lawsuit,
K.E.J. received a substantial settlement annuity that would provide for her
care for the remainder of her life." Then, because of the brain damage
K.E.J. suffered she was adjudicated as a disabled person."' Her maternal
aunt, V.H. became her guardian and currently K.E.J. lives with her. 06
At the age of twenty-four, K.E.J. was sexually active despite her
guardian's efforts to deter her."0 7 V.H. asked the court to authorize sterili-
zation of K.E.J. because she felt this was the most effective method of
preventing pregnancy.'o Although K.E.J. was receiving Depo Provera in-
jections as a means of birth control, V.H. stated that they caused K.E.J.
significant weight gain, elevated blood pressure, and other adverse side ef-
fects.'0 9 K.E.J.'s doctors agreed with V.H.'s assessment that tubal ligation
was the best method to prevent K.E.J. from becoming pregnant, and their
written statements were attached to V.H.'s petition to the court to author-
ize sterilization." 0
K.E.J.'s GAL met with K.E.J. to discuss the potential procedure and
found that K.E.J. understood the consequences of the procedure and its
permanency."' Also, the GAL noted that "there is no doubt in [her] mind
that [K.E.J.] does not want the tubal ligation procedure" because K.E.J.
expressed her desire to eventually have a baby."2 At the time of K.E.J.'s
meeting with her GAL she was in a relationship with a man she called her
fianc6e and expressed her wishes to marry him."' Although, prior to
K.E.J.'s conversation with her GAL she agreed to the sterilization, she
later stated that she had agreed because she was in V.H.'s presence and
knew V.H. wanted the procedure performed." 4
When making its final order, the lower court first found that K.E.J.
lacked the mental capacity to make an informed decision regarding the
102. K.E.J, 887 N.E.2d at 709.
103. Id
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id
107. Id
108. Id.
109. Id
110. Id
111. Id.
112. Id
113. Id.
114. Id
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sterilization and it was not likely that her condition would improve in the
near future."' Next, the court found that K.E.J. was capable of reproduc-
ing as her mental incapacity did not affect her physical maturation."'
Also, she was sexually active at the time of the hearing."' Finally, there
was uncontested evidence that K.E.J. "'could never conceivably carry out
parenting duties,' and that having a child taken away from her would result
in 'irreparable psychological damage."' While all of these factors would
point towards a ruling for sterilization, the court rejected V.H.'s petition
for sterilization because there was no evidence that a less intrusive method
of birth control could not be utilized."' The court did make a note that al-
though V.H. was looking out for K.E.J.'s best interest, at that time there
was not a need for a permanent form of birth control.120
APPELLATE COURT DECISION
V.H. appealed the lower court's decision citing that the court erred in
denying her petition since she had presented clear and convincing evi-
dence that a tubal ligation was in the best of interest of K.E.J.12' The Illi-
nois Appellate Court noted this was a case of first impression in the state'22
and because there is no governing statute, it would "look to the basic rights
and interests that ha[d] to be considered and balanced in determining the
standard which must govern [its] disposition." 23
In analyzing the case, the court first looked to the fundamental pri-
vacy rights that would be affected in sterilizing an adult ward, which were:
"(1) the right to bear children, and (2) the right of personal inviolabil-
ity."1 24 These rights were examined under the Skinner decision1 25 and the
K.E.J. court addressed concerns that state-sanctioned involuntary steriliza-
tion could be extended to revitalize the eugenics movement. 126 However,
in K.E.J.'s case, the ward's mental incapacity stemmed from the severe
head trauma she suffered as a child,127 thus the fear that ruling in favor of
115. Id. at 713.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 714.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 715.
124. Id.
125. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
126. K.E.J, 887 N.E.2d at 709.
127. Id.
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sterilization could promote the ideology of eugenics was unfounded. In
cases where the ward is adjudicated as incompetent, the right to bear chil-
dren and the right of personal inviolability are not absolute. 128 Previous
courts have ruled that "parents may constitutionally exercise control over
[their child's] decision about whether or not to bear a child," and this court
analogized that ruling to the guardian-ward relationship; the court found
that the guardian can make the same decision for the ward so long as it is
in the ward's best interest.'29
While courts have ruled in favor of parents' rights to exercise control
over their child's decision, courts must protect minors and wards to ensure
that parents and guardians are not abusing their powers.' Therefore,
"courts can override the will of parents and guardians to assert fundamen-
tal rights of children and wards which cannot be preempted."'"' Because of
this necessity to safeguard wards' and minors' rights, the court sought to
"implement strong procedural and substantive safeguards for all cases" in-
volving requests to authorize sterilization of a minor or a ward.'32
As this was a case of first impression in Illinois, the court had no
statutory guidelines by which to abide, so it looked to cases in other states
including the Grady case for guidance.' As previous courts had required,
here the petitioner needed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
sterilization was in the best interest of the incompetent ward.'34 When as-
sessing the best interest of the ward, the court relied upon and then
adopted the six-factor test set forth in Grady, subject to the requirements
of the Illinois Probate Act.'35 The six-factors taken from Grady were re-
quirements number two, three, four, seven, eight, and nine.'36
The Grady six factors needed to be reconciled with the Illinois Pro-
bate Act which defines the duties of guardians for disabled adults.'37 The
Illinois Probate Act creates a "dual standard"' that guardians must follow
when making decisions for their wards. The "dual standard" requires that
a guardian use the substituted judgment standard, which means the guard-
ian must attempt to fulfill the ward's wishes as if the ward were competent
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 717.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 718.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Grady, 426 A.2d at 482-83.
137. KEJ., 887 N.E.2d at 720.
138. Id
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to make the decision.139 Then the guardian must substitute that ward's
judgment for their own.140 If the guardian cannot determine what the
ward's wishes would have been in the situation, then the guardian must act
in the ward's best interest; then this the best interest analysis should be
used and evaluated under the Grady six factor test.'4 '
In the case at hand, because K.E.J. sustained her brain injury which
rendered her incapacitated at a young age it is impossible to determine
what she would have wanted in this situation.142 Thus, the substituted
judgment standard is not possible because no one can determine what the
ward would have wanted to occur.143 The court, therefore, turned to the
best interest analysis and used the Grady six-factor test.1"
After considering all of the factors, the court found "that the trial
court did not err in concluding that K.E.J. would have a constant need for
contraception due to her inability to raise a child and the emotional pain
she would suffer were a child of her to be taken away by the state."145
K.E.J.'s need, however, could be satisfied by other means of contraception
that are less intrusive and less emotionally distressing, thus the denial of
the petition was affirmed. 146
ILLINOIS LEGISLATION & WHAT IT MEANS
After the conclusion of the K.E.J. case Equip for Equality, an Illinois
organization aimed at furthering the rights of disabled individuals, made a
significant push for legislation to be passed in Illinois addressing the re-
productive rights of disabled individuals.'47 On August 11, 2009, Illinois
Governor Pat Quinn signed the public law that took effect on January 1,
2010, which now requires a guardian to go before the court to petition for
sterilization of their ward, as opposed to making the decision on their
own.148 Prior to this legislation, Illinois was one of only sixteen states
without a law on the books regarding involuntary sterilization.'4 9 Zena
139. 755 111. Comp. Stat. 5/1 la-17(e) (2010).
140. Id
141. Id.
142. Id. at 721.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 723.
146. Id.
147. Illinois Legal Advocate, Governor Quinn Signs Law Banning Sterilization of Adults With Disabilities
Without Court Order, (Aug. 12, 2009), available at:
http://www.illinoislegaladvocate.org/index.cfm?fuseaction-news.newsDetails&newslD=940
148. Robert, supra note 7.
149. Id
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Naiditch, founder and CEO of Equip for Equality spoke of the new legisla-
tion and stated, "This step in the right direction is critical to the protection
of the fundamental rights of people with disabilities.""'
The Illinois law calls for a different analysis than that which was laid
out in the K.E.1 case. First, the law requires that a guardian of a ward ini-
tially obtain an order from the court granting the guardian authority to
consent to the sterilization."' When seeking the order, the guardian must
file a verified motion which alleges the facts that demonstrate the need for
sterilization.'52 After the verified motion is filed, the court will appoint a
GAL to report to the court on issues relevant to the case that require inde-
pendent investigation."' If the ward requests counsel, objects to the ster-
ilization, or her position is different than that of the GAL the court may
appoint counsel to the ward.154 Next, a medical and psychological evalua-
tion of the ward is required.' 5 Also, the court must "determine . .. whether
the ward has capacity to consent or withhold consent to the proposed ster-
ilization and, if the ward lacks such capacity, whether the ward is likely to
regain such capacity."'
If the ward does not have the capacity to consent and is unlikely to
regain the capacity, then the court looks to whether the ward clearly de-
sires the sterilization or not.' If so, then the sterilization can go forward
after a medical and psychological evaluation is made.' If the ward does
not have the capacity to consent and does not want the sterilization to oc-
cur, then the court will look to the medical and psychological evaluation
before making a decision.' Prior to authorizing a guardian to consent to
sterilization the court must first find, by clear and convincing evidence,
that all of the following factors are met:
The ward lacks decisional capacity regarding the proposed ster-
ilization.
The ward is fertile and capable of procreation.
The benefits to the ward of the proposed sterilization outweigh
the harm.
150. Illinois Legal Advocate, supra note 147.
151. 755 111. Comp. Stat. 5/11 a-17.1(a) (2010).
152. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1 la-17.1(b) (2010).
153. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1 la-17.1(c) (2010).
154. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1 la-17.1(d) (2010).
155. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/I la-17.1(e) (2010).
156. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1la-17.1(f) (2010).
157. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11 a-17.1(g) (2010).
158. Id.
159. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1 la-17.1(h) (2010).
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The court has considered less intrusive alternatives and found
them to be inadequate in this case.
The proposed sterilization is in the best interest of the ward. In
considering the ward's best interest, the court shall consider the
following factors:
The possibility that the ward will experience trauma or psycho-
logical damage if he or she has a child and, conversely, the pos-
sibility of trauma or psychological damage from the proposed
sterilization.
The ward is or is likely to become sexually active.
The inability of the ward to understand reproduction or contra-
ception and the likely permanence of that inability.
Any other factors that assist the court in determining the best in-
terest of the ward relative to the proposed sterilization."'o
Three significant differences are seen between the new Illinois legis-
lation and the decisional standard set out by the K.E.J. court. First, under
the new Illinois law, the court neither evaluates the ward's ability to care
for a child nor the possibility that the ward may marry in the future and
with a spouse will be able to care for a child. Second, the new law does
not require a court for look at evidence that scientific or medical advances
may occur within the foreseeable future which could improve the ward's
mental capacity or provide less drastic methods of sterilization. Finally,
the new law does not require a showing by the petitioner that the steriliza-
tion is sought in good faith and for the benefit of the ward rather than for
the simple convenience of the petitioner.
The first difference is significant because a ward may certainly marry
in the future and that spouse could potentially be able to care for a child.
A court cannot be all-knowing and with certainty state that if the ward
marries she will marry someone who is incapable of caring for a child.
Perhaps if the ward and her spouse were to care for a child together they
would be considered capable parents as opposed to if the ward were to
solely care for the child. The legislation, by failing to include this factor in
the assessment, potentially deprives an incapacitated person of having a
child for which she could care for in the future.
Today, the potential for new medicines, cures, and treatments is ever
evolving. With the constant flow of information through the internet one
can easily find out if new medical advances are on the horizon, and the
160. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1la-17.1(h) (2010).
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Illinois legislation fails to take this into account. If a medical procedure or
treatment were to come on the market which could improve the ward's
mental capacity, the court should be required to hold off on authorizing
consent for the sterilization because of the ward's potential for eventually
expressing her clear desires. Additionally, if a new contraceptive method
were to come into existence in the near future, the court should at least
evaluate whether this new method could be less intrusive, less drastic, and
as effective for the ward. Without this requirement, the court can miss an
opportunity to provide a better solution for the ward rather than ordering
sterilization.
Because the new law does not require a showing by the petitioner that
she is seeking the authorization for the sterilization in good faith, there is a
risk that a court will grant a sterilization sought out for the petitioner's
convenience and not in the best interest of the ward. Although the court
requires clear and convincing evidence of the named best interest factors,
it leaves room for potential abuses of guardianship powers.
CONCLUSION
Illinois has taken a significant step in protecting the rights of wards
by legislating a standard that courts are to utilize when evaluating petitions
by guardians to sterilize wards. Today a guardian can no longer go to a
doctor and request that her ward be sterilized; the guardian must first ad-
dress the issue with the court. The court then has an opportunity to protect
the rights of the ward and it takes a genuine look at the best interest of that
ward. The KE.I case brought this issue to light in Illinois and the result
was a law that is meant to protect all future wards who may face this issue.
However, the law differs in three significant ways from the standard laid
out in KE.J. Although the law appears extensive and takes significant
precautions to safeguard the ward's right to exercise control over her body
and her right to bear children, it misses key factors which could be detri-
mental to the ward. Illinois took a large step in the right direction when it
enacted this law, however, if a court were to also examine the three miss-
ing factors from K.E.J. it could offer wards even more protection.
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